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The Market for 33 Percent Interest Loans. 
Financial Inclusion and Microfinance in India 
 
Markus Pauli* 
 
Abstract 
 
Financial inclusion is the process of building viable institutions that provide financial services to 
those hitherto excluded. These may include savings, insurances, remittances, and credit. 
Microfinance became the most dominant method for achieving financial inclusion. However, 
different microfinance schools of thought recommend opposite ways for attaining financial 
integration. India is a particularly insightful case study due to the sheer number of people 
excluded from formal financial services, as well as the spectrum of actors and approaches. The 
aim of this article is threefold. First, defining financial inclusion, depicting its status quo in India 
and comparing it to its South Asian and BRICS peers using recently released data from the Global 
Findex database. Second, focusing on microfinance as the dominant vehicle for achieving 
financial inclusion by scrutinizing its definitions, contrasting its two leading "schools of thought" 
and analyzing the central role of its dominant group-based approach. Third, the article will 
examine why people opt to take micro-credit at 33 percent interest rates. 
 
* Markus Pauli is a Lecturer in Global Affairs at Yale-NUS, Singapore. 
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Introduction: Financial Inclusion 
 
A bank account is – in many countries – still a privilege. However, account ownership improved 
substantially in the last years. Today 63 percent of people in developing countries have an 
account at a bank, a microfinance institution, or another type of regulated financial institution – 
compared to 42 percent in 2011.1 South Asia is the region with the largest gain regarding account 
ownership with 70 percent in 2017 compared to 32 percent in 2011. This contrasts to Sub-
Saharan Africa (43 percent, up from 23 in 2011), Middle East & North Africa (43, up from 33) and 
Latin America & Caribbean (54, up from 39).2 People without access to formal accounts and other 
financial services use informal alternatives, which are costly, unreliable or insecure. For loans, 
they depend on family, friends, shopkeepers or money lenders. Financial inclusion is the aim of 
changing this: the process of ensuring access to timely, adequate and affordable financial 
services.3 Definitions of financial inclusion usually focus on availability and access.4 I argue that 
one has to look beyond the numbers and include an assessment of the quality of financial 
inclusion. Even more so, after several severe financial and microfinance crises it is not enough to 
focus on the outreach of financial inclusion. The numbers of loans disbursed, loan size and 
repayment rates are essential. Equally important are issues of appropriateness, affordability, 
grievance mechanisms, and procedures for repayment difficulties. 
 
Access to financial services is, however, merely one element of financial inclusion. Aynsley 
emphasizes the significance of financial literacy and capability.5 Financial literacy can be defined 
as the capability of understanding how to manage financial resources. That means how to earn, 
save, invest, borrow and spend money. It requires basic numeracy but even more so, the 
knowledge and understanding of opportunities, risks, and alternatives. The necessary 
foundation for achieving financial literacy is financial education.6 (See Figure 1.) Financial 
capability can be defined as the capability of converting financial literacy into action. It requires 
practical abilities, motivation as well as decision-making capacity. Building financial capabilities 
requires commitment and endurance, which are scarce resources. Even more so, in times of a 
"quest for numbers," as Ghate described the Indian microfinance boom.7 
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Figure 1. Financial Inclusion Trinity. 
 
 
Compiled by Author. Source: Based on Aynsley (2010). 
 
 
Financial inclusion features prominently on the agenda of international institutions. The Group 
of Twenty (G-20) initiated the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion in Seoul in 2010.8 The G-
20 Financial Inclusion Action Plan focuses on loans for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), consumer protection and literacy regarding financial products, as well as markets and 
payment systems.9  
 
Status Quo of Financial Inclusion in a Comparative Perspective 
 
What is the status quo of financial inclusion? How does India compare with its South Asian and 
BRICS peers? The World Bank´s Global Findex Database provides a quantification of financial 
inclusion.10 The percentage of people with an account – either at a financial institution (including 
banks and microfinance institutions) or through a mobile money provider11 – is the most basic 
quantitative measure for financial inclusion. India achieved the most substantial increase, 
compared to its South Asian and BRICS peers, from 35 percent in 2011 to 80 percent in 2017. 
(See Figure 2.) This success was achieved by the Prime Minister's People Money Scheme (Pradhan 
Mantri Jan-Dhan Yojana, PMJDY), which Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched in August 2014. 
This National Mission for Financial Inclusion aims to provide savings & deposit accounts at banks 
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as well as financial services such as remittances, insurance, credit and pensions in an inexpensive 
manner. These accounts can then be used by the government for direct transfers of subsidies 
and welfare provisions, to prevent leakages.12 The President of the World Bank, Jim Yong Kim, 
praised it as an “extraordinary effort.”13 The Guinness World Records features it as the fastest 
dissemination of most new accounts at banks.14 India outperforms Bangladesh, the home to 
some of the largest and best-known Microfinance Institutions such as Grameen, BRAC, and 
ASA.15 The number of accounts in Bangladesh stagnated between 2011 and 2014 around 30 
percent – and then increased to 50 percent. In Pakistan merely, nine percent of the population 
over 15 years old was in possession of an account in 2011, that rose to 21 percent in 2017.  
 
 
Figure 2. Account (% age 15+), BRICS and South Asia, 2011-2014-2017. 
 
 
Compiled by Author. Data Source: World Bank, “The Global Findex Database 2017,” 
2018, https://globalfindex.worldbank.org (accessed May 16, 2018). 
 
 
India was also successful in closing the gender gap regarding account ownership. While in 2014, 
the gender gap was unusually large in India, both in comparison to Bangladesh and the BRICS – 
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with 62 percent of Indian men versus 43 percent of Indian women owning an account. Merely 
three years later, 83 percent of men and 77 percent of women have an account (see Figure 3). In 
Pakistan, the percent of women owning an account is astonishing low: a mere 3 percent in 2014, 
up to 7 percent in 2017 – compared to 35 percent of men in the same year. Given that the vast 
majority (90 percent) of clients at microfinance Institutions in Bangladesh are women,16 the 
country faces a surprisingly large gender gap regarding account ownership: 36 percent of women 
versus 65 percent of men.17 In Russia and South Africa, slightly more women than men have an 
account.  
 
Figure 3. Gender Gap for Account (% age 15+), BRICS and South Asia, 2017 
 
 
 
 
Compiled by Author. Data Source: Global Findex Database 2018. 
 
 
In addition to the access of women to formal accounts, one can assess the inclusiveness of a 
financial sector by looking at accounts by income group. India is leading ahead of its BRICS and 
South Asian peers with a gap between the poorest 40 percent and the richest 60 percent of five 
percent. (See Figure 4.) Huge is this income gap regarding account ownership in Brazil (22 
percentage points), China (20 points), Bangladesh (17) and Pakistan (12). Particularly impressive 
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is the achievement in India, which reduce its income gap regarding accounts from 14 percentage 
points (in 2011) to five points (in 2017). 
 
Figure 4. Rich-Poor Gap for Account (% age 15+), BRICS and South Asia, 2017 
 
 
 
 
Compiled by Author. Data Source: Global Findex Database 2018. 
 
 
The number of accounts at formal institutions, however, is only one aspect of financial inclusion. 
Bank accounts might be inactive (which in doubt, might be due to long-term savings) or dormant. 
When surveying individuals with a financial institution account whether they used the same in 
the last year to withdraw money, the results for 2017 are: India (43 percent), Bangladesh (52 
percent), Pakistan and South Africa (both 66 percent), Brazil (77 percent), China (78 percent), 
Russia (82 percent) – in contrast to USA (94 percent) (Global Findex Database 2018).18 Hence, 
many accounts at formal financial institutions in South Asia, particularly in India – with more 
than half (!) – and Bangladesh are inactive. 
 
Mobile banking is regarded by many as the next big thing in financial inclusion. The usage of 
mobile phones for financial services, however, differs substantially between countries. Generally, 
the low-income countries take the lead. The results in 2017 for "sent or received domestic 
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remittances through a mobile phone (percent senders and recipients)" are low-income-countries 
(51 percent, before 28 percent in 2014), lower-middle-income (17 percent, before 11) and upper-
middle-income (40 percent, before 7) (Global Findex Database 2018). The variance among 
different lower-middle-income countries is astonishing: Kenia (95 percent, before 90), 
Bangladesh (64 percent, before 24), Pakistan (25 percent, before five) and India (five percent, 
unchanged). Among the other BRICS (all classified as upper middle income), China (54 percent, 
before nine) takes the lead, followed by Russia (38 percent, before eight) and South Africa (38 
percent, before 18) and Brazil (six percent, before zero).19 Generally, Africa takes the lead in 
mobile banking. Not unsurprisingly, given that the pioneering mobile payment provider M-Pesa 
launched in 2007 in Kenya. There is a considerable potential to utilize mobile phone technologies 
to reach the unbanked. In India, more than 50 percent of the unbanked population (190 million 
or 11 percent of the adult population are unbanked) have a mobile phone.20 In China, 82 percent 
of the unbanked population (225 million or 13 percent of the adult population are unbanked) 
have a mobile phone.21 
 
Bangladesh is seen as a global leader in financial inclusion regarding loans. One out of four 
Bangladeshis reported a loan from a microfinance institution (MFI) or bank in the last year when 
asked in 2011, topping loan provisions in the United States and with a distance those in BRICS 
countries. (See Figure 5.) However, this self-reported loan provision in Bangladesh decreased 
sharply to circa 10 percent in 2014 and 2017. This survey finding calls for further qualitative 
investigation into the reasons for this decline. Generally, Bangladesh experienced, according to 
the global findex data, a decline in borrowing any money (including all sources) from 48 percent 
in 2014 to 37 percent in 2017. As of 2017, Russia leads the BRICS states regarding the percentage 
of people who borrowed from a financial institution. India and Pakistan come in last in this 
comparison. 
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Figure 5. Borrowed from a Financial Institution (including Microfinance Institution) (% age 15+), 
BRICS and South Asia, 2011-2014-2017 
 
 
Compiled by Author. Data Source: Global Findex Database 2018. 
 
 
In summary, financial inclusion consists of several complementary aspects. These include access 
to financial services such as savings accounts, remittances, insurances, loans or pension 
schemes. It has been argued that beyond access, financial literacy and financial capability are 
crucial elements of financial inclusion. As the Indian case shows, both private (non-for profit and 
for-profit) institutions and the state play a crucial role in financial inclusion. The Indian state 
functions not only as legislator and regulator (Priority Sector Lending scheme, see below) but 
also as a core actor in the provision of accounts at financial institutions (Pradhan Mantri Jan-
Dhan Yojana scheme) as well as the largest provider of microfinance (through its Self-Help-Group 
Bank Linkage Program). Essential for the sustainability of private financial institutions (especially 
those dealing with the most vulnerable sections of society like microfinance institutions) are the 
social license to operate (trust by society), linked to that a favorable political climate (political 
risk) and some degree of legal protection.22 
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Microfinance as the Dominant Model for Financial Inclusion 
 
“[Microfinance is] one of the most important policy tools aimed at the poor.”23 
 
“Ultimately, it’s Indian microfinance] something like subprime lending [...] The same 
incentives are operating here... it was securitisation and derivatives that operated in 
the US. Here it is the priority sector lending by banks.” 24  
  Y V Reddy 2010, former Reserve Bank of India Governor 
 
Misperceptions and incorrect descriptions obscure the understanding of microfinance. Due to 
the range of actors, services, objectives, and assertions, this does not come as a surprise. It is 
essential to clarify the basics, such as how to define microfinance, contrast its competing schools 
of thought, understand the centrality of its common group approach and why people take 
microcredit and other financial services in the first place. The answers provide insights into what 
microfinance is – and what it is not. Microfinance is no panacea for poverty alleviation as claimed 
by advocates. Research shows that it can enhance clients´ capabilities if done reasonably and 
responsibly, and it can contribute to building a sustainable, inclusive financial sector. However, 
microfinance can also reduce clients´ capabilities. Not least by dis-empowering them through a 
patronizing approach, by causing or aggravating over-indebtedness and social tensions through 
the use of peer-pressure for loan recovery. Karim provides an anthropological account of 
adverse impacts of microfinance in Bangladesh focusing on NGO governmentality.25 The author 
asserts that "indebtedness has created heightened forms of strife and subordination in the lives 
of the female borrowers. (...) (and) how kin obligations have become enmeshed with 
indebtedness, creating toxic effects that lead to strife and competition among women 
borrowers."26 
 
Defining Microfinance 
 
Scrutinizing the plethora of microfinance definitions, like those found in academic dictionaries is 
insightful: 
 
„A term for financial services aimed at very low-income individuals and communities who would be 
otherwise excluded from banking, savings, and credit arrangements. A common form is micro-credit, 
based on poor people pooling their savings and taking it in turn to access them (see Grameen Bank). 
Microfinance institutions are often caught between being co-opted into mainstream finance on the 
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one hand, for example by stock flotation, and dependence on state largesse and private donors on the 
other.“27   
 
This definition highlights that microfinance targets very low-income individuals and 
communities, who in several countries are predominantly female, who else lack access to formal 
“banking, savings, and credit arrangements.” Informal financial services are often available. Poor 
households use them – especially credit – on a regular basis, as we will see. The definition 
furthermore refers to one element of micro-finance: micro-credit, as distinguished from other 
aspects like savings, insurance or remittances. Its description is wrong. The author instead is 
describing Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs). They provide micro-credit, “based 
on poor people pooling their savings and taking it in turn to access them.” ROSCAs are, however, 
a particular version of informal, group-based, peer-to-peer lending. Microcredit does not, at its 
core, entail lending amongst members of informal groups.  
 
I argue that microfinance refers to formalized institutions, including banks, NBFCs (Non-Banking 
Financial Companies, and (semi-)formal organizations such as NGOs.28 The definition 
furthermore denotes the linkage of informal groups to formal financial institutions. In India, the 
most comprehensive scheme is the Self-Help-Group Bank Linkage Program (SHG-BLP), which 
helps self-help groups (SHGs) to obtain collective loans from formal financial institutions. Also, 
in the Grameen model, the clients do not access the money they pooled together, instead 
Grameen Bank initiates the group formation. After that, the MFI provides loans to two of the 
women in the group. Further loans – to them and the other group members – depend on their 
repayment performance.  
 
Finally, many microfinance institutions (MFIs) achieve financial sustainability beyond "stock 
flotation" or "dependence on state largesse and private donors." Though, scholars pointed out 
that MFIs struggle to meet the double bottom line – achieving financial sustainability as well as 
a positive socio-economic impact. 
 
Let us scrutinize a different dictionary definition:  
 
"A method of enhancing quality of life and improving health for people living in extreme poverty, by 
providing very small interest-free or very low-interest loans to enable them to start a small, local 
enterprise. (…) Indian subcontinent and Africa, where the program has perceptibly raised living 
standards and improved population health."29  
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This definition makes the major and unsupported assertion of microfinance having “perceptibly 
raised living standards and improved population health.” Contrariwise, people “living in extreme 
poverty” in South Asia and Africa do mostly not obtain microcredit. Furthermore, microfinance 
does not provide “very small interest-free or very low interest loans.“ Critics regularly point to 
usury interest rates. Interest rates will be discussed in detail later in this article.  
 
One last definition of micro-credit from an academic dictionary to consider: 
“Lending small amounts of money to very poor households at commercial rates, rather than at the 
‘usurious rates of loan sharks’ (S. Buckingham-Hatfield2000). The classic model is the Grameen Bank, 
initiated in Bangladesh by Mohammed Yunus. Similar micro-credit schemes have been set up 
throughout the developing world, and have been enormously effective, not only in alleviating poverty 
and improving child nutrition but also in increasing the voluntary use of contraception. N. Burra et al., 
eds. (2005) assess the impact of micro-credit. Poverty trends would probably not be reversed, ‘but 
booming micro-credit would at least speak for a world where justice would have a greater place’ 
(Santiso (2005) Int. J. Soc. Sci. 57, 185).“30 
 
It is controversial how effective microfinance is. Is it "enormously effective, not only in alleviating 
poverty and improving child nutrition"? Does it increase "the voluntary use of contraception“? 
This definition is useful in one way. It shows, how also in academic literature microfinance 
attracts high hopes and assertions, such as, “a world where justice would have a greater place."  
 
To conclude, consider this Asian Development Bank (ADB ) definition:  
“Microfinance is the provision of a broad range of financial services such as deposits, loans, payment 
services, money transfers, and insurance to poor and low-income households and, their 
microenterprises. Microfinance services are provided by three types of sources: 
• formal institutions, such as rural banks and cooperatives; 
• semiformal institutions, such as nongovernment organizations; and  
• informal sources such as money lenders and shopkeepers. 
Institutional microfinance is defined to include microfinance services provided by both formal and 
semiformal institutions. Microfinance institutions are defined as institutions whose major business is 
the provision of microfinance services.“31 
   
ADB’s “institutional microfinance“ is, as I argue, microfinance as understood in common usage. 
In journalistic, academic and all-day language, moneylenders do not provide microfinance. Nor 
do we use microfinance when describing pawnbroker's shops or payday loan providers. 
Microfinance providers assert on their homepages and in their reports that they are fostering 
positive social impact, whether they stem from the public, private or civil society sector and 
whether they are non-profit or for-profit. This is also true for the listed Mexican microfinance 
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institution (MFI), Compartamos which is notorious for its interest rates of 100 percent. 
Compartamos states on its homepage that it is "committed to eradicating financial exclusion.” 
They claim to aspire to create economic, social, as well as human values. Referencing these 
proclamations is not merely a polemic. These MFIs might well pursue or even somewhat 
accomplish these goals. Instead, it is meant to highlight and illustrate the self-perception of 
microfinance providers. Hence, the ADB definition needs, as I argue, two modifications to mirror 
its common usage. First, one has to exclude "informal sources such as money lenders and 
shopkeepers." Second, one has to include that microfinance pursues a so-called "double-bottom 
line," i.e., financial sustainability and a beneficial socio-economic impact. 
 
Microfinance Schools of Thought – Welfarist versus Financial System Approach 
 
The "double-bottom line" in microfinance refers to, first, financial sustainability – regarding the 
microfinance institution themselves. Contrasting the unsustainability of subsidized credit their 
financial objective is profitability. Second, microfinance strives for positive social impact, in the 
form of financial inclusion, fostering entrepreneurship, poverty alleviation or (women´s) 
empowerment.32 There is a third defining element of microfinance: the quantitative aspect of 
outreach to the poor. Together, this forms the "triangle of microfinance" which is useful in 
analyzing "existing trade-offs and synergies" between these three "overarching policy objectives 
in microfinance."33 (See figure 10.) The new paradigm of non-subsidized, for-profit credit to poor 
clients emerged in the mid-1980s thanks to two factors. First, it was due to the failure of state- 
and development bank-driven loan programs designed for smallholder farmers in the 1960s and 
1970s. Secondly, it was thanks to the success of microfinance pioneers like Bangladesh´s 
Grameen Bank, Bolivia´s Prodem (BancoSol) and Bank Rakyat Indonesia (RBI).34 
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Figure 6. Microfinance Triangle 
 
Compiled by Author. Source: Adapted from Zeller (2003: 6) and Woller, Dunford & Woodworth 
(1999: 2). 
 
 
Impact, outreach and financial sustainability are the defining aims of microfinance, depicted in 
the triangle of microfinance. (See Figure 6.) They are shaped by the macroeconomic framework, 
sectoral policies and the socio-economic context (outer circle) as well as institutional innovations 
(inner circle). In the words of the authors: 
 
“The inner circle represents the many types of institutional innovations that contribute to improving 
financial sustainability (such as employment of cost-reducing information systems), impact (such as 
designing demand-oriented services for the poor and more effective training of clients), or outreach 
to the poor (such as more effective targeting mechanisms or introducing lending technologies that 
attract a particular group of clients). The outer circle represents the external socioeconomic 
environment as well as the macroeconomic and sectoral policies that directly or indirectly affect the 
performance of financial institutions. Innovations at the institutional level (the inner circle) and 
improvements in the policy environment (the outer circle) contribute to improving the overall 
performance of financial institutions.”35 
 
There are two schools of thought in microfinance. The poverty lending or welfarist approach 
contrasts the financial system approach36alternatively, institutions approach37. (See figure 6.) The 
welfarist approach focuses on socio-economic welfare impact as the central aim. Supporters 
stress the depth more than the breadth of outreach. They prefer to provide loans to more 
impoverished clients but attempt to ensure a sustainable positive socio-economic impact. The 
aim of achieving financial sustainability must take a backseat. The prime goal is “self-employment 
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of the poorer of the economically active poor.”38 The welfarist approach advocates a focus on 
credits for women, on the basis that increasing women´s control is most beneficial to children´s 
welfare. Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and FINCA in Bolivia follow the welfarist approach, as do 
their international offshoots and replicates.39 
 
Institutionists (as referred to by Woller et al.) advocate the financial system approach and 
emphasize that microfinance must be financially sustainable. Not only is this necessary to deliver 
financial services reliably in the long run but also, to benefit from economies of scale as well as 
access to finance provided by mainstream financial markets by achieving profitability. They insist 
that a focus on outreach and profitability will benefit their clients as they disburse more loans in 
a shorter period, through increased efficiency as well as accelerated institutional innovations. 
Most importantly institutionists argue that the enormous demand can only be met by the 
financial markets, not by government and donor funding. In this view, the future of microfinance 
would be “dominated by numerous large-scale, profit-seeking financial institutions that provide 
high-quality financial services to large numbers of poor clients. Because of their insistence on 
financial self-sufficiency, institutionists eschew subsidies of any kind.”40 Bank Rakyat Indonesia 
(BRI) and BancoSol in Bolivia are major MFIs that follow the financial system approach. The 
financial system approach is also the most widespread in the academic literature – not least 
promoted by the World Bank, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and USAID.41 
 
Group-based Microfinance to Reduce Risks and Costs 
 
High risks and high costs are the main reasons why private banks have not been very keen on 
lending to the poor. Information asymmetry leads to higher risks and costs – both for banks and 
customers.42 Credit providers have to deal with the threat of adverse selection (attracting 
customers who have a higher likelihood of defaulting on their loans) and moral hazard (risky 
behavior of customers in the knowledge that others will face the consequences). Due to 
information asymmetry clients, on the other hand, bear the risk that the financial institution is 
not trustworthy, that the “institution” (often in the form of the person claiming to represent it) 
disappears with the clients' money or goes bankrupt. This risk arises more regarding savings, 
insurances as well as remittances. In case of a bankruptcy of a loan supplier, the customer loses 
a potentially very valued credit source. The bankruptcy of an institution that collected savings 
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can lead to the forfeiture of a substantial part of one´s savings. Hence the stricter regulations for 
saving providing institutions in most countries. 
 
Group-lending involves three essential elements: First, it encourages group´s self-formation. 
Secondly, it leads to the group member's joint liability for the repayment of credits. Third, it 
entails a conditionality of further loans to group members based on the loan repayment 
performance of their group peers. This group approach is the most common method for aiming 
at profitability when lending small amounts to low-income people, often in rural areas – in the 
absence of collaterals. Moneylenders are, in a sense, in a better position than formal institutions. 
First, they have the local knowledge or contacts to judge the creditworthiness of applicants – to 
prevent adverse selection. Second, they can observe the financial conduct of their clients – to 
avoid moral hazard. Third, they can and do pressure clients and their relatives in case of 
repayment delays – to ensure enforcement of repayment. For private and public actors, it is more 
problematic and expensive to obtain such knowledge and to secure repayment.  
 
Coleman observed that in "tightly knit communities that exist in many villages in less 
industrialized countries (LICs), members are well placed to judge the creditworthiness and to 
observe the actions of their peers, thus mitigating the problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard."43 Stiglitz names it peer monitoring and models “gains from improved monitoring” and 
compares it to the “costs of increased interdependence” regarding Grameen clients. He 
concludes: “the gains from peer monitoring more than offset the loss in expected utility from 
the increased risk-bearing.”44 Stiglitz identifies three elements as essential for peer monitoring: 
First, adequate incentives, i.e., the conditionality of future loans. Second, small groups to avoid 
problems of bigger groups such as free riding and the reduced incentive to monitor given lower 
costs in case of defaults. Third, homogeneity in the group, i.e., regarding risk characteristics such 
as default proneness, is usually accomplished through group self-formation.45 
 
Joint liability can reduce adverse selection through self-selection, as well as moral hazard through 
peer monitoring. It also “gives group members incentives to enforce the repayment of loans and 
reduces the lender’s audit costs for cases where some group members claim not to be able to 
repay.”46 The peer pressure created by joint liability, however, also carries the risk of high social 
costs. When credit groups fail, and credit becomes unavailable from this source for all group 
members, the relations between the clients can be jeopardized and have “far-reaching 
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consequences for village life.”47 Such acknowledgement of the possible negative social costs of 
peer pressure is, by and large, lacking in the econometric literature. Contrariwise, raising fear of 
“wrath of other group members” is indicated as a valuable tool, denoting it “social collateral” to 
be “harnessed” by financial institutions.48 Without irony, the authors refer to the “wider 
significance in contract design in situations where market and non-market institutions interact” 
and of “drawing on the punishment capability of some agents to improve upon outcomes.”49 
They summarize that if “the group is formed from communities with a high degree of social 
connectedness, then this may constitute a powerful incentive device and hence may serve to 
mitigate any negative effects from group lending.”50 The question remains: should one focus on 
“any negative effects” for the institutions or the clients? 
 
In summary, the double-edged group mechanism is a central element of microfinance. There is, 
on the other hand, a tendency towards individual loans in microcredit, which builds on contracts 
and collateral. Nonetheless, for most of the (rural) poor, the group mechanism is the available 
model.  
 
Microfinance – Grameen Style 
 
One of the microfinance forerunners is Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. It provides an often-
replicated model for new microfinance institutions (MFIs). Also, most of the large Indian MFIs 
deploy the Grameen approach, which describes the method of delivering financial services by 
establishing and sustaining small joint-liability groups – not the structure of an MFI´s ownership 
and management. The clients of Grameen Bank own the majority of its shares. The nearly nine 
million, mainly female Grameen Bank clients own the vast majority of its shares. In its Board, 
nine out of thirteen members are borrower-elected members.51 How does the Grameen 
approach work in practice? MFI loan officers advertise and explain their financial services to 
potential clients and encourage low-income women to start a five-person credit group. The New 
York Times reports:  
 
"Although loans are made to individual entrepreneurs, each individual is in a group of four or five 
others who are in line for similar credits. Together they act as co-guarantors. If one individual is unable 
to make timely payments, credit for the entire group is jeopardized, which results in heavy peer-group 
pressure on the delinquent. (…) At first, only two members of the group are allowed to apply for a 
loan. Depending on their repayments, the next two borrowers can apply, and then the fifth."52 
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The group meets weekly in its village with members from around eight other credit groups. The 
Grameen center manager leads these meetings, during which all clients pay their weekly dues in 
front of the group. Often clients do not differentiate between the various parts of their “weekly 
bill” such as interest rate, mandatory saving, and loan instalment.53 If a client fails to attend a 
meeting or is unable or unwilling to pay, the center manager tries to convince the group 
members. This takes the form of “exerting moral pressure (reminding them of their promises to 
pay regularly, or appealing to their good nature by telling them that if they didn't pay he might 
have to pay out of his own pocket), by delaying the processing of requests for new loans, by 
hinting that he would reduce loan values, or simply by using his authority to keep the members 
sitting there for hours on end until full repayment collection had been made.”54 Pressure on 
those on the verge of default also stems from members of the joint liability group.  
 
The Market for 33 Percent Interest Loans 
 
Over the last decades, India witnessed, like many of its peers, several attempts to urge or even 
force banks to provide adequate services to low-income clients – also by nationalizing banks and 
establishing new Regional Rural Banks. However, banks hardly feature as a loan source for low-
income and poor people. (See figure 7.) This backdrop makes the success of microfinance 
institutions in the last two decades stand out. The data from the most extensive household 
survey in India shows clear segregation of household borrowing sources between the income 
groups.55 Rich and high middle-income individuals use banks as their primary loan source. Lower 
income groups rely on family members and friends as their top loan source given their 
inadequate access to formal sources. Moneylenders are the second most crucial credit source 
for people with lower incomes. However, microfinance institutions and bank-linked self-help 
groups (SHGs) become an increasingly more popular loan source among the poor and those with 
low-middle-incomes.  
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Figure 7. Sources of Household Borrowing by Income Group (2009-10) 
 
Category HH 
Count 
(%) 
Annual 
Income 
(Rs ‘000) 
Source of Borrowing 
Friends 
& Family 
Money-
lender 
SHG/MFI Bank Any 
Rich - I 0.3 1,367 0.4 0.2 0.1 18.0 20.1 
Rich - II 0.6 834 3.3 2.8 0.6 16.8 20.1 
High middle income - I 5.6 479 9.9 8.6 2.1 22.8 30.9 
High middle income - II 8.8 292 10.4 8.2 1.9 20.0 32.7 
High middle income - III 9.5 209 11.8 7.8 2.3 14.2 32.2 
Middle income - I 16.3 148 16.5 10.2 4.1 12.9 36.5 
Middle income - II 10.2 108 20.9 13.1 6.0 10.4 40.4 
Low middle income - I 22.4 77 21.5 14.6 7.0 7.3 42.1 
Low middle income - II 19.3 49 24.7 14.3 7.7 5.2 42.6 
Poor - I 5.2 31 29.5 14.1 7.0 4.6 46.1 
Poor - II 1.8 19 30.0 13.3 6.7 3.1 44.9 
Overall 100.0  20.6 12.6 5.8 9.3 39.9 
 
Source: Sane and Thomas (2013: 61).56 
 
 
Usury interest rates for informal credit are widespread in developing countries. Studies show 
average interest rates for informal credit to poor people (below the one dollar per day poverty 
line) in rural India of 57 percent per year.57 Slightly less poor people (with one to two dollars 
income per day) pay a bit less on average as they have more access to other sources. The authors 
determine that the "(y)early interest rates in the 40 to 200 percent range (or even higher) are 
the norm, and the poor pay more than the rich.”58 
 
Microcredit interest rates also appear to be usurious. Why should an interest rate of 33 percent 
per year be anything else than exploitative?59 The average Annual Percentage Rate (APR) for 
microcredit in India is 33 percent – while it differs substantially by the type of microfinance 
institution (MFI).60 (See Figure 8.) It is noteworthy that NGOs have on average a similar APR like 
for-profit MFIs (both privately-owned and publicly traded). However, the minimum and 
maximum APR of NGOs is lower than that of their for-profit competitors. Co-operatives are the 
positive exception with an average APR of 25 percent. The highest APR observed at co-ops (30 
percent) is lower than the average APR for all other types of microfinance institutions. 
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Figure 8. Indian Microfinance Annual Percentage Rate of Charge (APR)61 including Interest, Fees 
and Insurance, by Institution Type 
 
Type of Institution Minimum of APR 
(Interest + Fees + 
Insurance) 
Maximum of APR 
(Interest + Fees + 
Insurance) 
Average of APR 
(Interest + Fees + 
Insurance) 
Co-op 10% 30% 25% 
NGO 17% 45% 34% 
Other 28% 45% 35% 
Privately-owned For-Profit 20% 58% 33% 
Publicly traded For-Profit 25% 43% 33% 
Aggregate 10% 58% 33% 
 
Source: MFTransparency (2011: 28). Figures are rounded. 
 
 
33 percent is the lowest average microfinance interest rate for the World´s regions.62 These rates 
reflect, to an extent, the high expenses of providing microfinance. However, they are in stark 
contrast to the extreme costs of informal alternatives such as local moneylenders (36 to 120 
percent), moneylenders from outside the local community (160 to 225 percent) or middlemen 
selling agricultural inputs (48 to 75 percent). (See Figure 9.) They are also in contrast to the highly 
subsidized costs of government schemes like “Pavalavaddi” by the Government of Andhra 
Pradesh, which reimburses interest amounts above 3 percent, paid by all SHG members as an 
incentive for on-time repayment of bank loans.63 
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Figure 9. Interest Rates of Different Loan Sources in Andhra Pradesh  
Service Provider Effective Interest Rate (Per Annum)64 Terms and Conditions 
Group-Based, Semi-formal 
Self-Help Groups (SHGs) 
 
(The group needs to save for 
the first six months to access 
loans from banks.) 
 
3% 
(“Pavalavaddi” scheme of the Government of 
Andhra Pradesh reimburses interest amount 
above 3% to incentivise on-time-repayment.) 
12% - 24% 
(For loans from group-internal savings.) 
12% 
(For loans taken from the federation.) 
Amount: Rs. 5,000 to 50,000 65 
Loan Term: 2 to 5 years 
Instalment: Monthly 
Collateral: No 
 
Microfinance Institutions 
(MFIs) 
 
 
27% - 45% 66 
(Including processing fee, mandatory 
insurance.) 
Amount: Rs. 5,000 to 30,000 
Loan Term: 50 weeks 
Instalment: Weekly 
Collateral: Group Liability. No 
physical collateral. 
Individual, Informal, Unsecured 
Moneylenders (Weekly) 
(from outside community) 
(“Kangali bank”) 
160% - 225% Amount: Rs. 2,000 to 10,000 
Loan Term: 10 weeks 
Instalment: Weekly 
Collateral Requirements: No 
Daily Finance Corporations 78% - 120% Amount: Rs. 2,000 to 10,000 
Loan Term: 100 days  
Instalment: Daily 
Collateral: No 
Individual, Informal, Secured 
Moneylenders (Local) 36% - 120% 
(Depends on urgency, collateral & credit 
history of borrower.) 
 
Amount: Up to Rs. 200,000  
Loan Term: Flexible 
Instalment: Monthly for interest; 
bullet repayment of principal. 
Collateral: Secured & unsecured. 
Middlemen 48% - 75%  
(Depends on crop cycle.) 
Amount: Rs. 5,000 - 30,000 (also in 
kind, i.e. agricultural inputs) 
Loan Term: 6 to 12 months  
Instalment: Monthly for interest; 
bullet repayment of principal. 
Collateral: Pledge agricultural 
produce. 
Pawnbrokers 30% - 36% Amount: Depends on value of gold.   
Loan Term: Flexible 
Instalment: Bulleted 
Collateral Requirements: Gold 
Individual, Formal, Secured 
Banks (Crop Loans)
 
7% - 13% Amount: Depends on crop & land. 
Loan Term: Up to 3 years 
Instalment: Bulleted (2 months 
after harvest) 
Collateral: Hypothecation of crops/ 
additional security / 3rd party 
guarantee 
Source: MicroSave (2011); abbreviated and edited. 
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This APR includes fees, interest as well as compulsory insurance and deposits.67 Comparing 
interest rates by World regions shows that South Asia has the lowest average interest rates in 
microfinance.68 This achievement of comparable "lower" interest rates in South Asia is not least 
due to the scale – with 43 million active borrowers in India and 26 million in Bangladesh.69 South 
Asia also has the smallest interest rates charged for the 5 percent most expensive MFI loans (95th 
percentile). Their average interest rate is 44 percent – that is “inflation adjusted” but without 
taking into account “hidden costs” such as compulsory savings and insurances. In Latin America 
& the Caribbean, the equivalent rates are the highest worldwide with 73 percent. In this regional 
context the Mexican MFI Compartamos, the first MFI with an initial public offering (IPO), charged 
its infamous 100 percent annual interest rate, which includes a 15 percent value added tax.70 
Muhammad Yunus, the founder of Grameen, attested Compartamos of being “absolutely on the 
wrong track”: “Their priorities are screwed up. (…) When you discuss microcredit, don't bring 
Compartamos into it. (…) Microcredit was created to fight the money lender, not to become the 
money lender.”71 
 
Conclusion 
 
Financial inclusion is a central element of the international development agenda and intents to 
establish sustainable financial institutions to provide services like loans, savings and insurances 
to formerly excluded people. It requires in addition to the availability and quality of such services, 
the fostering of financial literacy as well as financial capability. Financial capability can be seen 
as the capability to convert financial literacy into action. The recent progress towards financial 
inclusion in India was illustrated and contrasted with its South Asian and BRICS peers. Between 
2011 and 2017 the Indian government managed to increase the number of formal bank accounts 
from 35 percent to 80. The current Indian government managed, through its Prime Minister's 
People Money Scheme (Pradhan Mantri Jan-Dhan Yojana), launched in 2014, to reduce its 
considerable gender gap of 19 percentage points in 2011 to six percentage points in 2017. Also, 
India has the lowest rich-poor gap (of five percentage points) regarding account ownership 
among its BRICS and South Asian peers. However, that more than half of the accounts in India 
(57 percent) and Bangladesh (48 percent) are inactive, puts these achievements into perspective. 
 
Definitions of microfinance are, as demonstrated in this study, often misleading, make grand, 
unsubstantiated claims or are wrong (e.g., asserting that microcredits are interest-free 
Pauli 2019 Market for 33 percent interest loans. India Review    (Accepted Manuscript – AM) 
 
 22 
respectively having "very low" rates). The Asian Development Bank definition of microfinance 
has been modified: Microfinance refers to financial services beyond mere micro-credit; targets 
poor and low-income households and their enterprises; includes (semi-)formal institutions and 
hence excludes moneylender; aims at a double bottom line – combining profitability with positive 
socio-economic impact. The microfinance trinity aims at achieving financial sustainability, 
outreach, and positive impact. There are two competing microfinance schools of thoughts: the 
welfarist or poverty-lending approach contrasts with the institutionists or financial system 
approach. Proponents of the welfarist approach emphasize the outreach´s depth to the poor as 
well as the socio-economic welfare impact. Institutionists prioritize the sustainability of the 
financial institutions as well as the breadth of outreach to the poor. Key indicators for 
institutionists are portfolio size, number of clients, repayment rates and profitability. This “quest 
for numbers” played an essential role in the Indian microfinance crisis in 2010 (in Andhra 
Pradesh) and drew on economies of scale to attract funds from financial markets. The argument 
is that the demand by the not-yet-banked is enormous and that only financial markets can 
provide the required financing. Going beyond these schools of thought, I argued to also consider 
the ownership and governance structure and its impact on the aims and processes of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs). 
 
Providing loans to low-income people is associated with high costs and risks. Central challenges 
are "adverse selection" and "moral hazard" due to information asymmetry. Group-based loan 
provision seems to overcome these challenges, thanks to group self-formation, joint liability as 
well as the conditionality of further loans on repayment behavior. Peer-monitoring and peer-
pressure are, however, a double-edged tool and bear high social costs in cases of default. The 
usurious costs of informal credit explain why low-income households take 33 percent interest 
loans from microfinance institutions. While MFIs delegate some aspects of group-formation, 
book-keeping, monitoring, and repayment enforcement to the members of the group, 
nonetheless high labor costs apply when offering microfinance to low-income people. However, 
clients value the additional loan source provided by microfinance institutions, which is less 
expensive than moneylenders and often more timely, convenient and reliable than government-
schemes with lower costs. 
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